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I. PPMC?
There has been a mad rush by Physician Practice Management Companies
("PPMCs") to leave the business. That makes sense in light of the lack of
capital following the industry devaluation following the failed Medpartners/
PhyCor merger in January, 1998 and the adverse effect of the accounting
changes mandated by the Emerging Issues Task Force of the SEC. Was it a
bad idea for many sellers from the start though? What lessons should sellers
take away from the latest fad to hit the physician practice industry?
II. THE PROMISE
In speaking about the PPMC business, it is important to focus on the most
relevant point in its evolution. Early on, PPMCs experimented with several
affiliation models in search of one that seemed to fit. They employed doctors
directly in their own companies and, where permitted by applicable law, they
bought medical practices (in both stock and asset purchases). The model most
PPMCs ultimately settled on was the "management model." As such, with
today's "Pure PPMCs," the two core agreements are an asset purchase
agreement and a management services agreement.
One still has to be careful not to confuse "niche product" providers with
PPMCs. Some providers of specialty care services (i.e., anesthesia, OB/GYN,
neonatology) also get the "PPMC" brand, when in fact they are actually more
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like employers and group practices in the traditional sense. They may use
stock power agreements, stock purchase option agreements and other
"management looking" mechanisms, which give them the right to become the
doctors' employers at the flick of a switch, but they are different because they
are much more integrated and aligned with their doctors.
Though it is beyond the scope of this topic, suffice it to say that today's
PPMCs and niche providers differ from each other in at least the following
ways:
1. PPMCs attracted physicians by offering a purchase price and
management ability, while niche providers attract physicians by
giving them the security of employment. That is, PPMCs sold
"independence," while the other sold a form of job security.
Ironically, it is the delusion of independence which is at the heart
of PPMC failures, since physicians never became fully aligned
with the company;
2. PPMCs require long term arrangements (20-40 years), while
niche providers limit their requirement to pay their doctors to an
average of five years or base in on financial performance,
typically EBIDTA measures; and
3. PPMCs are running for the hills, while niche providers are just
running. Though niche providers have been hurt by the market's
punishment of the entire health care industry, they seem to have
remained committed to their core businesses.
The first PPMC representative a doctor usually met was a salesman. The
salesman was very affable and described a relationship which seemed too
good to be true, promising to:
1. Pay the doctor a lot of money for the doctor's assets, receivables
and goodwill;
2. Save the doctor from administrative headaches;
3. Lower overhead through economies of scale;
4. Enhance the doctor's ability to get favorable managed care
agreements and to attract new business;
5. Use the PPMC's money to develop ancillary services; and
6. To the extent the doctor will take stock in the PPMC, make the
doctor rich through the stock's growth.
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M. THE PURCHASE PRICE
When viewed closely, the first item is actually a revenue stream purchase.
As described below, the PPMC's fee (the "management fee") was based on a
percentage of the practice's revenues (gross or net). If you increased the
purchase price, you had to increase the management fee, or vice versa. How
much a revenue drop (management fee) the doctor would tolerate drove the
purchase price.
Understanding this was elusive for many doctors but remains key for
anyone working in or with the industry. Though a full understanding is
beyond the scope of this article, one key point should be made: the purchase
price (excluding the receivables and asset payment, if any) is simply the
PPMC's prepayment of some amount of a practice's earnings. If, for instance,
ten percent of a practice's earnings is $I OOK, the PPMC might pay four to
eight times that amount at closing. Why ten percent? Because that is the
agreed upon amount of the management fee. If, however, the PPMC paid the
seller fifteen percent of the anticipated practice earnings, the management fee
would be fifteen percent. The purchase price, in essence, is simply the
prepayment of the portion of an anticipated revenue stream. In that respect,
the management fee charged by the PPMC is not really a management fee at
all. That is, it is not a fee payable by the practice for the management services
provided by the PPMC. It is instead, the repayment of the purchase price,
with a return factored in.
Here is another way to look at it. PPMCs simply prepaid the doctor (the
purchase price) some portion of what the doctor would receive in
compensation over a period of years. As such, doctors who entered into
PPMC relationships received the value for instance of five years worth of
reduced compensation at closing. If for instance a doctor who earned $100K
each year was willing to forego $10K each year, he would get somewhere
between $40K and $80K at closing as the purchase price. In return, his or her
annual compensation would be reduced by $1 OK during the entire duration of
the management services agreement (20-40 years).
The price was paid to the selling doctors through a combination of cash
and stock. Some PPMCs issued notes in lieu of some or all of the cash or
stock. The stock's vesting was generally delayed one year by SEC rules, and
underwriters may have had additional lock up restrictions. The price of the
stock at vesting is of course anyone's guess. Historical performance is often
a good indicator though, and the 52 week performance report of some of the
top PPMCs at the end of 1998 showed the devastation caused by Wall Street's
disenchantment with the industry following collapse of the Medpartners/
PhyCor purchase. Even in the prior year, however, the stocks were clearly
1999]
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volatile, but some were still receiving "Buy" or "Strong Buy" recommenda-
tions as late at the third quarter of 1997, making future stock value extremely
difficult to predict:
1997 1998
Company High Low High Low
PhyCor 35.50 18.87 33.25 3.93
Medpartners 32.00 7.12 32.00 1.31
FPA Medical
Management 40.00 14.87 40.00 0.06
PhyMatrix 17.00 11.00 16.50 1.93
Any notes were typically subordinated to senior lenders which had a
perfected security interest in the PPMC assets. The seller's goal of course was
to obtain adequate security for the PPMC obligation. Create a security interest
for the doctor. Be sure the obligated parties are solvent and that there is
adequate capital or assets to satisfy the obligation. Of course, the reality was
often that the PPMC was fairly inflexible on these points and was controlled
by the lenders.
The purchase price issue was often key for a selling doctor, particularly
one who viewed the PPMC transaction as part of a retirement strategy. The
seller understood, at least initially, that there would be a drop in revenues
because of the management fee, but the doctor conceptually "booked" the
entire purchase price and was persuaded by its time value. In short, the only
sure thing, but the most persuasive thing, was the cash paid at closing.
As for buying the accounts receivable, sellers had difficulty with the fact
that the payment would be charged back to the practice or would be handled
as part of the reconciliation or due to/due from. The asset purchase proved,
however, to be a relatively insignificant issue since only the practice
accountants saw the effect of passing the opportunity to depreciate the assets
on to the PPMC. Practically speaking, the A/R issue is more significant in
unwinding these transactions, since they tend to have been very degraded.
IV. MANAGEMENT
Selling doctors were typically faced with one of two situations: the
company had management infrastructure or was going to purchase it after
going public. For those that had the infrastructure, it was easy enough to
check on the backgrounds of the personnel and to find out about the systems
in place. For those that were going to buy it after going public, it was a leap
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of faith. Regardless, however, the notion generally conflicts with another
PPMC selling point: seamless independence.
Most PPMCs sold the idea that the transition to a PPMC-run practice
would be fairly seamless and would preserve local physician control. "Your
staff will stay, but will become our employees. We will never do anything
you do not agree to. Everything will remain the same," many sellers were
told. If, however, the seller was trying to solve a management problem, why
would they want everything to remain the same? Though it is true that many
PPMCs tried to increase the sophistication of practices through information
systems, they generally lacked the personnel to run them or to produce useful
information.
V. OVERHEAD REDUCTION
This issue also ran up against the "seamless independence" promise.
PPMC attempts to reduce overhead through changes in physician behavior or
reduction in staff or benefits proved to be extremely difficult, so overhead
reduction efforts have been largely limited to group purchasing discounts.
When offset by the increase costs of sophistication through costlier
management and information systems, net overhead reduction has also proved
elusive.
VI. ENHANCED CONTRACTING
Physicians joining PPMCs often agreed with PPMC claims that there
would be safety in numbers. Many PPMCs seem not to have fully appreciated
antitrust restrictions or to have considered business realities. For the Pure
PPMC, a management model with competing medical practices in the same
market simply does not create sufficient economic integration necessary for
effective joint contracting. This is nothing new. Unfortunately for the
PPMCs and the doctors, there have been relatively few meaningful changes
since Southbank IPA in 1989. Moreover, even the Statements of Antitrust
Enforcement Policy in Health Care, issued August 28, 1996 have done little
to alleviate the longstanding antitrust restrictions. At the end of the day,
PPMCs are usually left with a Messenger Model for contracting purposes, an
unexciting and ineffective mode of contracting.
From a business perspective, in a market of heavy managed care
penetration like many metropolitan areas of Florida, it would take a lot of
market power to improve a physician's contracting position. In such areas,
there are often so many competing doctors that, even ignoring the antitrust
restrictions, it is probably impractical for a PPMC to coalesce a large enough
contracting group, except perhaps in .distinct geographic pods.
1999]
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Attracting new business is tied to the PPMC's ability to create an effective
managed care. contracting organization; but there is a direct relationship
between being left out of a closed panel and the ability to enter the panel on
becoming part of the contracting organization which participates. Though it
is undoubtedly an issue for many specialists whose contracting opportunities
are limited by closed panel networks, the issue seems to be on the wane
because of payer response to point of service product demand, direct access
legislative changes and geographic coverage issues.
VlI. ANCILLARY SERVICE DEVELOPMENT
Where the concept does not involve "designated health services," it
becomes purely an issue of economic analysis. What is the cost of
development? Is there sufficient volume to support the service? Will
managed care direct patient referrals to the service out of the practice? The
surprise for many doctors in PPMC relationships arose in their failure to
understand the "fine print" and health care regulations. In particular, many
doctors were surprised to learn that they would be carrying all of the costs of
developing ancillary services, including paying the cost of the capital loaned
by the PPMC.
Squaring the development goals of the practice with state and federal self
referral restrictions has also proven to be vexing. The "group practice"
restrictions in particular compel both integration and size in order to be
economically viable, both of which have proven to be difficult to achieve.
VIII. WHAT MOTIVATED THE PPMCs
Why would a PPMC enter into this type of transaction? The core of the
answer is that Wall Street investors placed a huge value on PPMC practices
which grossly exceeded what the PPMC paid for them. Why? Because Wall
Street typically invests in the future earnings of a business, not on its current
value. If one could pay $10K for a car, then sell it for $I OOK, that would be
a windfall for the seller. That type of arbitrage was compelling to PPMCs,
and investors lined up with a lot of money to invest in the industry. The
investors liked the fact that the management relationships were long term (20
to 40 years). They enjoyed the accounting benefits resulting from 40 year
amortization; and were persuaded by the fact that many agreements contained
additional income opportunities for cost savings and for the development of
new services. That was the golden age of the industry.
Though it was very significant, arbitrage was only one piece of the puzzle.
As with any start up business, the debt a PPMC acquires early in its existence
is far more expensive than the debt it takes on once it proves itself. Venture
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capitalists, for instance, commonly expect a return on their investment of 40-
50% because they are betting on a generally unproven business. To prove
itself, a PPMC had to do one thing: grow. And PPMC growth required a lot
of money. Once a PPMC grew out of being a small cap company (under $100
Million) institutional investors, which generally expect a return of only 10-
20%, could be expected to invest in the company. Hence, the dynamics of the
industry itself created an inherently dangerous cycle of taking on debt to grow
the company and replacing expensive debt with cheaper debt (but only if the
company continued to grow). Unfortunately, since the market shift following
the Medpartners/PhyCor failure and the E1TF changes, a new cycle is crushing
the industry, the investors and the sellers: stagnate because of lack of capital
from falling stock prices, drown under debt load, cut overhead, provide no
services to sellers, and wait for lawsuits to be filed.
IX. THE LESSONS
Perhaps one of the most difficult parts of the PPMC experience is that
PPMCs were not sufficiently incentivized to deliver the services sellers
thought they were to receive. Even more sophisticated physicians who
understood the revenue stream aspect of the transaction believed in enhanced
same store performance. After all, many PPMCs had an economic incentive
to save the practice money and to grow the practice, as most received a piece
of the savings and the growth on top of the management fee.
Nevertheless, there is something insidious about the PPMC business
model itself, which necessarily leads to the issue of the need for regulation.
The fact that the model went as far as it did and that it involved an essential
service like physician services is disturbing. Medical business is not a normal
service; it is an essential service. Why did the SEC permit outrageous values
to be set for the companies? Why did the State or federal regulators not take
a close and meaningful look at the effect of the business on health care before
enabling it so? This is beyond the scope of this article, but the questions
remain because the adverse affect of the industry bottoming out may threaten
not only medical business but patient care as well.
Finally, physicians have to bear some of the responsibility. Frankly, some
of the promises made by the industry required a huge leap of faith. What
advice was obtained? Was it followed? If the PPMC was so committed to
enhancing bottom line performance of the practice, why did sellers not require
the PPMC to commit to this obligation in writing, and why are there generally
no disincentives in the management services agreements (MSAs) for a
PPMC's failure to perform? The MSAs commonly contain empty language
of intent, and this should never have been tolerated. Additionally, physicians
should refuse to believe that they can own a business without administrative
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headaches, and they should shut their ears to anyone offering them a "magic
pill." Physicians generally have two choices today: be in business and bear
the risks and rewards that being in business offers or become employed by
someone or something that will relieve them of the risks, the headaches and,
at least to some degree, the rewards.
Physicians and business people need to understand why the ground was
fertile for PPMCs. PPMCs, like PHOs and IPAs, are all borne out of the need
for physicians to integrate to survive in markets of shrinking reimbursement.
However, PPMCs and other passe models of physician integration have failed
or proven only partly valuable because they are premised on the delusion that
the benefits of true integration could be obtained without actually integrating.
Though PPMCs are just one point in what promises to be a long line of
businesses formed in response to the financial pressures doctors face, it is
probably safe to say that the only survivable business model for physicians
will have the following characteristics:
1. It will have effective and sophisticated mechanisms in place to
relieve the doctor from administrative headaches;
2. It will lower overhead through economies of scale;
3. It will enhance the doctor's ability to get favorable managed care
agreements and to attract new business;
4. It will involve access to capital to be used for economically
rational development; and
5. It will align the incentives of the doctors with the business itself.
[Vol. 7:495
